Warren Buffett Investing

When will BRK.B shares split 50 to 1

sopranouno — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 22:45:40 GMT

Does anyone ahve an idea when BRK.B shares will split 50 t0 1

Berkshire is not just a Financial Services company...

Jumoni — Mon, 16 Nov 2009 20:51:47 GMT

so it totally distorts my portfolio analysis.

Nothing to discuss here... just venting.

BRK buys Burlington Northern

EagleTed — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 15:54:23 GMT

It's buying about 2/3 of BRK's profit for 1/4th the cost. Most would consider that a pretty good deal.

Why doesnt Buffet Invest in Tobacco Companies?

mattym — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 15:12:14 GMT

I read quite a bit about Buffett and read that he commented that tobacco companies because of price margins and brand loyalty but he doesnt hold any positions and hasnt in the recent past?

Is it a moral issue? Just wondering because he didnt let the petro china the issue bother him.

Any idea on why? I see these being classic WB stocks.

Berhshire BShares

sopranouno — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 03:27:35 GMT

REad an article today that Berckshire B shares will be selling for $69 a share.There is going to be 50 t0 1 split.Time to buy very affordable now

Successor

realpro — Sat, 30 May 2009 15:17:40 GMT

With all the talented fund managers at the M* investment conference, you would think that some analyst would at least ask people like Bill Nygren, Bob Rodriquez, Jack Bogle, and Bruce Berkowitz if they have ever been approached by Buffet regarding succession. Warren has stated many times that he has already picked the Chief Investment Officer. It would seem possible that it is one of the attendees at this conference...or possibly someone at the conference knows something about the pick.

Health Care fraud perpetrated by GE and Genworth- now filed with SEC for investigation

upsidebill — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 14:19:01 GMT

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Bill Hoffman <publicaccountingcorp@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Sep 9, 2009 at 9:17 AM

Subject: The GE/Genworth business model and how it effects LTC and insurance policholders and stockholders, alike! 1- Can the Corporate profit motives of GE and Genworth serve the REAL needs of LTC policyholders when profits are the central.motive and not the welfare of Genworth previously until twisted in 2004 by GE

Subject: Actual experiences of claimants for GENWORTH LTC- causing many concerns on how GNW processes LTC as a reimbursable LTC expense(s) vs. direct payment of expenses & GE culpability, etc.
To: michael.fraizer@genworth.com, buck.stinson@genworth.com, patrick.kelleher@genworth.com, pamela.schutz@genworth.com, leon.roday@genworth.com, thomas.mann@genworth.com

To: Michael D. Fraizer, CEO and Buck Stinson, President of: Insurance Products,Patrick Kelleher, CFO, Pamela Schutz, Retirement Services, CEO, Leon Roday, VP/ General Counsel, Thomas Mann, VP Int'l-Key Executives, Genworth Financial

c.c. Jeffrey R. Immelt, CEO, General Electric, et al- sent via GE Fax#203--373-3131

Re:
1- Actual negative experiences of claimants that originally purchased GE LTC that were in 2004, transferred to Genworth LTC and made claims both to GE and subsequently to Genworth on LTC unrelated claims
2- A REVIEW of GE and Genworth documents, Master Agreement GE/Genworth, SEC Filings of GE and Genworth from 2003, thru 2009, Genworth Prospectus of 2004, expiring 2011
3- US June 3, 2009- Special Committee on Aging Hearing, Buck Stinson's Transciption
4- A Review of SEC Complaints filed against GE, et al
5- A Review of KPMG, Auditors for both Genworth and GE, KPMG's disclosures of "off-the- balance sheet" items
6- Implications of FINRA, FCRA, SEC, etc

In Re: Serious implications of the above, as it pertains to the above, etc, and reliance by LTC, etc., policyholders of GE that were removed from GE by GE and transferred by GE to be policyholders of Genworth, with and/or pending in 2010, without recourse to GE, etc

Memo:Dear Key Executives of Genworth:
AS referenced above, it has come to my attention, that exists numerous "inconsistencies" as well misconceived and misrepresented representations being made by Genworth's Key Executives and related literature of Genworth and Genworth's Sales and Servicing Agents!

GE's collections of billions of dollars of LTC premiums from 1980 through 2003, and then removal of GE Policyholders to Genworth for LTC , Mortgage, Life, etc. insurances claims and coverages has caused serious concerns as to:
1- GE culpability;
2- Genworth's ability to pay on current and future claimants;
3- While using premiums currently being paid for above insurance coverages to pay costs, damages, etc.
Colin Devine- Citigroup, Sept. 2, 2009- ".... (Genworth) Management continues to pursue a fundamentally flawed strategy........."
4- KPMG's 10-K Filings clearly disclose Practices of Genworth and originally GE, that jeopardize policyholders and stockholders!

Genworth's requirements to require LTC claimants to pay the claimants' expenses of ADL- activities of daily living- while the claimant is disabled- and when and until Genworth deems that the claimant has in-detailed-facts- having to be investigated for many weeks, if not in-fact months- will Genworth then initiate reimbursements not direct payments!

The entire essence of GE and now Genworth's promo is that the policyholders pay their premiums now and receive benefits and waiver of LTC premiums- often-time $5,000. per year! By Genworth's purposeful delaying claimants their legitimate needs fot LTC, the average claimant does not have money to pay such ADL expenses! Which then becomes the in-famous "Catch-22!" With no real money to pay for the claimants LTC, the claimants, if they have money-will pay until they seek medicaid! Which is alluded to even in Buck Stinson's June 3, 2009 speech to the Senate!

So the myth that Genworth will directly pay LTC is just a myth! The claimants have to pay, and "if" Genworth approves LTC coverages- in very copious forms- that only an accountant, or other professional could ever be able to complete! And, if Genworth denys coverage? An appeals period of 60+days goes into effect!
Even a clause by Genworth's policies state that no other legal actions can be initiated during an appeal of denial! Very clever to do this to unsuspecting policyholders! Should each policy applicant have a lawyer and or financial advisor, to help make decision to take Genworth LTC? Is Genworth disclosing to the many AARP, State Societies, individuals- what is required to make a LTC claim for Genworth benefits? I am certain that Genworth is not informing paying policyholders and pending applicants- of what it will take to receive solely reimbursements and not direct payments! As stated by many Genworth representatives! During which time- according Genworth Reps. Gail Cleary,Rep. of Pres. Stinson, Darcy, Shaw, Crista Lee- Sr. Benefit Analyst, Care Scout Evaluators- that diificulty communicating, etc- ARE AFTER A CLAIM IS FILED- IT WILL TAKE AT LEAST ONE WEEK TO EVEN SEND AN EVALUATOR CONTRACTOR AND NOT EVEN A GENWORTH EMPLOYEE! I HAVE PROOF OF ALL THAT IS BEING SAID IN THIS EMAILED MESSAGE!.

A Query was made about pre-planned knee surgery replacements now pending! The Genworth representatives responses were:
"No, there are no provisions by Genworth to evaluate ADL needs, until After the knee surgery! Thus, a LTC policyholder- possibly with no one to help, has to be evaluated after their surgery! This is just an example of what Genworth coverages will need to be covered! How can the average person after such pre-planned surgery, be able to develop a plan of care, hire qualified care givers, or even have money to do anything that Genworth now requires?

The scheme of collecting millions of dollars of insurance premiums and then thwarting claims is not unique! And in many ways seems to be able to fraught with a method to defraud the general public that is being promoted to become and or have become Genworth policyholders and/or were "twisted" by GE into Genworth!

This is not what was sold as LTC for hundreds of thousands of pre-paid premiums to GE and then in 2004- for LTC

Where in Genworth's reserves are there sufficient funds to pay legitimate claims? So, instead with enough delays and road-blocks, double-speak, and misleading disclosures- a claimant is uninformed!

Today in USA- the knowledge of LTC costs are astronomical! So Actuarial and with your Manager Advisors- Are ways to prevents claims being created by Genworth?

With my 40 years of Business Experiences as an Accountant and Businessman, I previously considered LTC an excellent way to provide a means to have LTC! Now with numerous financial reversals of policyholders, all your Genworth policyholders can hope and pray for that when they survive their heart attacks, strokes, surguries, etc- that Genworth will take care and pay for their LTC- and not look to the USA to pay- but Genworth! I know in MD- taxpayers get a Tax Credit if they have LTC insurance! IRS gives deductions! But for what is Genworth doing to provide and not thwart claims!

Yes- many say that- business is business, and Greed is Good, and profits for stockholders of Genworth is important!
But, now that Genworth has the exposures to pay both by direct sales of LTC and what Genworth was formed in 2004 by GE- as disclosed in SEC statements, etc. - to limit GE's risks and expenses from billions that GE collected from 1980 to 2003, and now Genworth from 2004- todate of 2009!

What is to be done by Genworth and GE to correct what I described above? I wait your reply!

I will be in DC on Sept 14, at the Genworth, et al LTC Government Conference! If you would like to meet at that time, or discuss my concerns? I will look forward such conversations, etc.

--
Sincerely,
William "Bill" Hoffman
PUBLIC ACCOUNTING CORPORATION
826 WEST 36th. STREET
BALTIMORE, MD 21211
Contact #:Office-410-366-1507 Fax:-410-800-2494
Bill Hoffman EMAIL:Contact info:
email: PublicAccountingCorp@gmail.com
cell phone: 443-527-6330

Fairholme Re-Buys Berkshire Hathaway

jagor — Wed, 26 Aug 2009 08:49:11 GMT

According to today's "Fund Times," Mornngstar reports that the Fairholme fund FAIRX bought about $150 million worth of Berkshire Hathaway in the second quarter of 2009.

Fairholme had sold off all its Berkshire shares last year.

If you haven't bought Berkshire, maybe it's time to check out Berkshire again. Fifty-two week high for BRK.B is 4700 and low is 2241. Yesterday's close was 3340.

In my own case, I bought BERK.B at around 2900 a few years ago and sold it around 4100. I currently hold no Berkshire shares.

Jagor

American Express as a buy

Elminster — Wed, 27 May 2009 18:51:33 GMT

Buffet has had American Express (AXP) in his portfolio for quite some time.

Is it still a good firm to buy.

Price drop 08/10/09

erryl — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 15:25:29 GMT

Any idea why the price is down 4+% today? I know earnings were released last Friday, but I didn't see anything that would justify such a drastic selloff. Did you?

Not worried, just curious...

erryl

Value investing

fopso01 — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 02:36:39 GMT

Seth Klarman, Ben Graham, Warren Buffett and others all support the notion of value investing versus any other investment style. what makes them so successful and other managers not so successful?

is it their personal skills or is it the style of investing that they follow? what makes these people so good at their jobs when so many others fail to outperform indexes? why doesnt everyone read all their books and invest like them?

just trying to wrap my mind around things as i watch Kobe and the Lakers work the Magic

Fairfax Financial Holdings (FFH)

scottf44 — Wed, 29 Apr 2009 18:50:02 GMT

For a long-term investor looking to put some money to work in a "Berkshire" like investment but without the risk of a "Warren Buffett" succession, do you think this is a good entry-point in Fairfax Holdings? I have done a lot of research on the company and am very impressed with the company, its culture, and its performance-- and most importantly, its treatment of its shareholders. Very respectable.

Any thoughts?

5 star stock performance

fivebobs — Tue, 05 May 2009 16:50:28 GMT

Has Moriningstar published any performance results for their 5-star stocks from say 3 to 5 years ago? Just how has the fair-value, discounted cash flow technique performed for a theoretical investor who started with such a portfolio?

Wow, BRK is really low

chipmunk — Sat, 31 Jan 2009 20:45:47 GMT

BRK.A is below $90K, and BRK.B is below $3K...

What’s Sillier than Double Counting? Triple Counting.

BargainHunter — Fri, 24 Apr 2009 15:49:34 GMT

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What’s Sillier than Double Counting? Triple Counting.

One of my favorite places to explore in the capital market is when market observers appear to “double count” either positive or negative attributes of a given security. A common example is a company with 1.) 3-5 years of earnings growth and 2.) 3-5 years of a charismatic, dynamic leader who drove said growth (typically in a bull market). Such bull market geniuses, such as Jack Welch, may be great leaders. However, I find it inadvisable to have invested because for a string of years GE had earnings growth and Welch. His greatness was counted (perhaps even managed counting) in the numbers. So, I would happily pay for the numbers but not the numbers and whatever led to them.

A recent favorite place to look for double counting appears in “closed-end funds”. These hippie dippy backwaters of the financial services industry have fixed numbers of shares and thus trade at either premiums or discounts to their net asset values (NAVs). So, for a value investor, one who seeks out the out-of-favor and unloved, these can sometimes, if only rarely, be very interesting. In boom times, they double count, if you will they double favor, and double love (apologies for the kinkiness of this explanation). The securities that these funds invest in are bid up so that their NAVs expand. For example, a late 1990s fund that invests in tech, or an early 2000s fund in real estate, mid aught fund in commodities, or late aught fund in treasury bonds, might have explosive NAVs and premium to that NAV. In bust times, their NAVs are beaten down. However, they are so despised by Mr. Market that they are not even picked up at beaten down NAVs, but are offered only a grudging discount to these NAVs.

So, NAV destruction can be rational and efficient or irrational and inefficient – to say that something is “cheaper” does not mean that it is “cheap”. That being said, “cheaper” is a decent place to start. Then, to say that something is “cheaper” and also that cheaper basket of securities is itself discounted again could be efficient and rational or not. However, it is now an even more decent place on which to focus. However, within this circle, there comes now an opportunity which, I hope, might be so good as to be – potentially – indecent. The situation of which I now write is rare throughout history, but increasingly common from late 2008 through the first half of 2009. Closed-end funds trading at deep discounts to NAV are suspending their dividends. In these cases, their retail-heavy shareholder base (they are too illiquid to garner much institutional money or what until recently was known rather ridiculously in a phrase that will likely receive zero Google mentions in 2009 and beyond as the “smart money”) will sell, sell immediately, and sell at any price whatsoever. Such folks often own these instruments for the “income”, an arbitrary feature and a feature wholly irrelevant to positive expected value seeking value investors (when Mr. Buffett launched Buffett Partners, she who was only temporarily Mrs. Buffett asked “what is the income?” to which he responded “my dear, it doesn’t matter what is the income but what is the outcome”). A recent addition to this list is Pimco Floating Rate Strategy Fund (PFN) a Pimco fund that focuses on syndicated loans. PFN is unloved and out-of-favor – Mr. Market just tried to dump it three times in a row.

screening for old school value

JunkMail — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 04:46:22 GMT

I like net-nets, and other old school value companies...

But I'm tired of doing vague screens at yahoo finance, morningstar (even the premium screener!), or msn's deluxe screener, and then doing laborious calculations myself to determine if any of the companies fit my criteria.

Is there a searchable database on the web that will make it possible for me to screen the database for companies whose NCAV is less than market cap, or book value per share plus dividends is a certain percentage of market cap, but only where inventory is no more than a certain percentage of current assets?

I know there are websites where I can get the results of such a screen - but I also know from doing my own digging that they miss some of the net-nets out there.

I'm willing to pay for such a readily manipulable database on which I can write my own screens - provided I can get good value of course...

WB, your investing secrets are still safe!

Ben Graham Fan — Fri, 30 Jan 2009 04:19:36 GMT

Interesting day today... had a visit with a campus and some soon to be graduating seniors from one of our nations top business schools. Let me first offer my praise for these kids were incredibely smart. Much smarter than I am when it comes to math, computers and finance. I listened to them discussing projects they were working on showing how they can model this financial event or that one. Brilliant minds... all of them.

I stumbled onto one group who asked for my input. Feeling humbled that they would care for my input I sat in on their discussion. The task, to accurately calculate the cost of capital and value a financial firm (name intentionally not given by the professor). The information given to the students was merely two years worth of income statements, balance sheets, price history, an avg. of bond rate, etc. The paperwork all screamed at them to calculate CAPM, BETA, etc. So one gentleman makes his estimate of BETA and says "is this right?". I replied, I don't know... I never use it. How is that? he asks. So I answer the typical what does Beta measure and how does that tell me anything about the value of the business? Well it helps you determine risk so that you can determine if the stock price will offer reasonable enough returns in compensation. So of course I proceed to go to the text book example... If a bank stock drops 60% in a short time would it not have a high Beta? By the same token if a house value drops by 60% would it not be the same? So is it riskier now to buy a house then 2 years ago? The student probed me some more, So what do you use to judge a business? I look at qualitative data first. I want to understand the business and the people running it. I want to know managers are shareholder friendly.

The session went on like that for about 20 minutes. In the end (righfully so) the kids came up with an answer just as their text books had taught them. The professor reviewed their answer and praised them. The leader of the group then looked to me I guess with some hope of getting praise for getting the answer right and says, "Did you really not know the answer?". My reply, "If it had been me I would have answered, not enough information." He still did not get it.

The answer my friends it that data is just that, data. I could go to 20 schools and hand them that problem. All would correctly use CAPM to give me an answer without knowing the answer is not that exact. Those numbers are no holy grail. If my math tells me the cost of capital for a firm is estimated at 10% and another person is at 11%. We very well may both be right. For the same reason I can value a company at $50 and you at $40. We all looked at the same numbersand yet still have different answers. Why? nothing is that certain in life. Now what would have impressed me and did was one kid in the group. He made a comment about how he thought they should be doing a risk based analysis of the companies assets to assess risk. I look forward to finding out where he is in 20 years.

Even with all the problem we have had in the recent market we are still making our college grads dependent on formulas. It is that same quant jockey mentality that got us into this mess. So what is a schools job these days? is it to encourage independent thinkers or to breed kids minds to fit into what the typical wall street firm wants? It seems to me that WB is correct. Some people get it and others don't. and no matter how loud he signs the praises of his investment style the majority will always doubt or ignore.

For those that doubt Buffett... well many are fools for thinking he is anywhere near perfect. But, his investment guidance and outlook still sems to shine bright even at his current age. Here is to living to be 140!

BGF

Who is today's Benjamin Graham?

JoaquinGrech — Fri, 16 Jan 2009 10:14:08 GMT

I direct this question to anyone familiar with the academic sphere.

Who could be called the Benjamin Graham of today? Someone with a long standing investing record, with vision and who is also mentoring and teaching at a university.

S&P changes Berkshire rating to negative watchlist

EagleTed — Wed, 25 Mar 2009 23:42:37 GMT

Fitch has already downgraded it to AA+, S&P may soon follow. No word from Moody's, which Berkshire has a 20% ownership.

Berkshire rarely needs to borrow, so the effect will be slight.

"Buffett admits mistakes in annual Berkshire letter"

jagor — Sat, 28 Feb 2009 15:21:33 GMT

Oh, no--our idol has turned out to have feet of clay! What's the world coming to?

"Buffett admits mistakes in annual Berkshire letter"

"OMAHA, Neb. – Billionaire Warren Buffett says he made at least one major investing mistake last year by buying a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak.

"The famous investor recounted his errors in his annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders released Saturday morning.

"Berkshire increased its stake in ConocoPhillips from 17.5 million shares in 2007 to 84.9 million shares at the end of 2008.

"Buffett says he did not anticipate last year's dramatic fall in energy prices, so his decision cost Berkshire shareholders several billion dollars.

"Buffett says he also spent $244 million on stock in two Irish banks that appeared cheap. But since then, he's had to write down the value of those purchases to $27 million."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090228/ap_on_bi_ge/buffett_letter

So it turns out that Warren Buffett makes mistakes just like us mere mortals--except when he make a mistake it costs his shareholders "several billion dollars."

Jagor

decided to remove found answer

lucky7 — Sun, 01 Mar 2009 17:09:06 GMT

Book List for Shareholders meeting?

ralphhh — Sat, 28 Feb 2009 18:09:44 GMT

I just noted in the Annual Berkshire Letter the following:

"Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books and DVDs. A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity."

Can anyone could provide a listing (or partial listing) of these books and DVDx?

I always like to read whatever Buffett is suggestion as he sometimes does in his Annual Letter.

Thank -- Ralphhh

Annual letter tomorrow!

BuffetDisciple — Fri, 27 Feb 2009 19:07:09 GMT

Buffet is going to release his annual letter to shareholders tomorrow. This is probably the most anticipated letter of his career. I, for one, cannot wait to read it.

Per share equity value and ROTC

JoaquinGrech — Wed, 25 Feb 2009 23:31:14 GMT

I'm not sure where to ask but I'm sure a good "buffettologist" should know the answer.

Is there a way to find out the per share equity value of a stock in Morningstar?

I know it's not as simple as Equity/Shares outstanding. Anyone? Is it listed somewhere?

Also, return on total capital (ROTC) I'm having trouble finding that one.

Thanks for your help.

Joaquin

Morningstar names Warren Buffett CEO of the Year

M*_Darrin — Wed, 07 Jan 2009 15:23:40 GMT

Morningstar today named Warren Buffett CEO of the Year. We have contemplated honoring the Berkshire CEO every year since we created the award, and this year we finally get the chance to officially acknowledge all that Buffett has done for Berkshire shareholders, both over the decades as well as in 2008.

http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=269952

Some have viewed Buffett's actions in 2008 as controversial and even as mistakes, yet we do not see these as any reason to lose confidence in Buffett's abilities, either as an investor or corporate manager.

What's your take on Berkshire's moves last year, and what do you think may be next for the Oracle? Give us your feedback.